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Introduction 
Over the past half century, employer-sponsored de-
fined benefit (DB) pensions have been crucial sources 
of retirement income and security.  However, the 
popularity of DB pensions in the private sector has 
dwindled, and competitive pressures may drive DB 
plans from the private sector altogether.  Significantly, 
this burden is not only a US phenomenon, as UK pri-
vate plan sponsors are also struggling to manage their 
DB pension commitments.  Nonetheless, a funda-
mental difference of opinion exists between UK and 
US policymakers about how to address the decline of 
the DB system. 
In the United Kingdom, DB stakeholders have 
accepted the plans’ decline as inevitable and are now 
promoting alternative mechanisms to shore up retire-
ment security.  For example, in the Pensions Act of 
2008, the UK government mandated that employers 
enroll eligible employees into a workplace pension 
and created a new second pillar pension institution, 
the Personal Accounts Delivery Authority (PADA), to 
facilitate the new policy.  In addition, UK policymak-
ers, and indeed most DB stakeholders, have endorsed 
the use of pension buyouts as a way to manage the de-
cline of this once important institution.1  A buyout al-
lows firms to pay an insurance company a fee to take 
over the assets and liabilities of their plan, thereby 
freeing them from their DB obligations.2  As such, 
UK policymakers perceive buyouts to be part of the 
process of unwinding an unsustainable institution, 
and most see the rising popularity of pension buyouts 
as a direct response to the increasingly burdensome 
nature of DB pensions.3
Conversely, policymakers in the United States are 
more interested in stopping the decline of DB plans 
than managing the decline.  They prefer to think about 
ways to extend this institution’s life rather than man-
age its death, and this attitude colors their response to 
pension buyouts.  
This brief describes in more detail why buyouts 
are embraced in the United Kingdom but viewed with 
a mix of suspicion and ambivalence in the United 
States.4  The first section determines what is driving 
the UK buyout activity.  The second section evaluates 
the outlook for the UK buyout market.  The third sec-
tion then contrasts UK and US policymakers’ views 
on the decline of the DB system and the utility of 
buyouts.  The conclusion draws implications for US 
policymakers from the UK experience.5
By Ashby H.B. Monk*question as to what changed.  Apparently, the impe-
tus for solvent buyouts was the accounting rules and 
regulations that came into effect around 2005.9  Sol-
vent firms decided that a buyout would be easier and 
less costly than compliance with the new rules and 
regulations.10  In sum, market demand has grown 
significantly – from a handful of insolvent companies 
with DB pensions to potentially all UK plan sponsors 
looking to offload what they perceive to be a burden-
some liability.11
The supply side has changed as well.  In the early 
2000s, only two providers offered buyouts: Legal & 
General and Prudential.  However, potential buyout 
providers noticed that demand was shifting from 
insolvent to solvent buyouts thanks to the additional 
burdens created by the 2004 Pensions Act and the 
new accounting rules.  A market in which all DB 
pension plan sponsors were potential clients was 
much more enticing for buyout providers than a 
market based on the handful of insolvent firms forced 
into buyouts.  A commensurate rush to tap this new 
demand for solvent buyouts ensued.  Today, intervie-
wees placed the number of firms actively interested in 
providing buyouts in the United Kingdom at between 
12 and 15.  (See Figure 1 for active participants in 
2008).12
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Figure 1. Market Share of Pension Buyout 
Providers in the United Kingdom, 2008
Source: Lane Clark & Peacock (2009).
The UK Buyout Market
Prior to 2004, companies settled pension obligations 
in the United Kingdom in two ways.  If solvent, the 
firm paid the benefits out as planned over the long 
term until the contracts “expired” upon the beneficia-
ries’ death.  If insolvent, the firm would buy a bulk an-
nuity covering many lives from a regulated insurance 
company, which would sever the relationship between 
plan members and the sponsoring employer. 
Originally, companies facing insolvency sought 
buyouts at the behest of either a regulator or a court, 
since the UK did not have a government insurer to 
take over pension obligations for bankrupt firms.  A 
disappearing plan sponsor would use the buyout 
as a mechanism to ensure as much payment of the 
pension benefits as possible with the available as-
sets.  Given that bankruptcies among plan sponsors 
remained relatively infrequent, the UK market for 
‘insolvent buyouts’ was small, turning over roughly 
£1-2 billion pounds per year for the better part of two 
decades.6  To place this figure in context, the total 
value of DB pension liabilities in the United Kingdom 
is approaching £1 trillion pounds.7
In 2004, the buyout market was set for a shake 
up, as the Pensions Act established the Pension Pro-
tection Fund (PPF).  Based on the US Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation, UK policymakers designed the 
PPF to protect pension benefits in situations where 
the sponsor failed and did not have enough money in 
the pension scheme to fund 100 percent of benefits.  
Since insolvent firms typically have underfunded pen-
sions, the expectation was that the PPF would crowd 
out the private insurance companies offering buyouts.   
However, despite the creation of the PPF, transac-
tional volume surged, increasing nearly fourfold to 
£8 billion between 2006 and 2008.  The changing 
nature of the DB pension obligation resulted in new 
demand (and supply) for buyouts. 
Interviewees in the United Kingdom explicitly 
linked the demand for buyouts to the growing DB 
burden.  According to UK DB pension stakeholders, 
buyouts allow companies to get out from underneath 
their DB liabilities through a one-time charge and get 
on with the core operations of their business.  “The 
company escapes volatility to its profit and loss ac-
count, levies to the Pension Protection Fund, and as-
set management fees on pension assets.”8  Given that 
insolvent buyouts had existed for years, this raises the 
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The Outlook for the UK 
Buyout Market
The scene was set for a dramatic expansion in the UK 
buyout market in 2008 (see Figure 2).  New entrants 
drove the price down just as demand among plan 
sponsors was spiking.  First, the funding level of the 
plans temporarily improved, making it an opportune 
time for many plan sponsors to transfer their pension 
burden.  Second, bond yields used to value liabilities 
increased, so the buyout prices came down.  The 
question is whether the resulting surge in activity in 
2008 was a product of a confluence of rare phenom-
ena, or the beginning of an increasingly large market 
in solvent buyouts. 
Capacity
Because insurers used so much of their available 
capital in 2007 and 2008, capacity constraints are 
limiting the ability of these firms to do all of today’s 
potential transactions.  According to one buyout 
provider, “There is not enough capital to fill demand 
for the insured solutions; pipelines are huge at the 
moment.” Indeed, one of the largest buyout providers 
said they were turning down up to 90 percent of their 
requests for quotes.  They simply do not have the 
capital to do all the deals that are available.13
 
Volatility
The conditions in the financial sector are such that 
pricing deals has become very difficult; insurers are 
reacting cautiously.  Also, pension plans have adopted 
a “wait and see” attitude on buyouts due to the dete-
rioration in the global economy.14
Therefore, insured buyout activity has declined 
in 2009.15  However, the recent financial crisis may 
have actually increased corporate interest in buyouts.  
With huge drops in asset values, the market volatility 
offers yet another illustration of how vulnerable plan 
sponsors are to exogenous shocks.  In fact, several 
UK pension consultants indicated that most of their 
clients were at least preparing their data to be able to 
do a buyout if the opportunity presents itself.16  More-
over, recent evidence suggests pension freezes and 
closures, which are preconditions for full buyouts, 
are accelerating in the United Kingdom.17  Overall, 
the long-term outlook for the buyout market remains 
favorable.
DB Pensions: A Difference of 
Anglo-American Opinion
Both UK and US plan sponsors are struggling to 
manage their DB commitments.  However, a fun-
damental difference of opinion exists between UK 
and US policymakers about how best to address the 
issue.  In the United Kingdom, policymakers perceive 
buyouts to be part of the process of unwinding an 
unsustainable institution: 
Then UK Minister for Pension Reform Mike  •	
O’Brien said in 2008, “A clear consensus has 
emerged.  Insured buyouts are often very sen-
sible and effective mechanisms for securing the 
pensions promise.  An insured buyout can give 
Figure 2. Insured Pension Buyout Activity in the 
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UK interviewees generally viewed the long-term 
prospects for insured buyouts as favorable.  None-
theless, three key constraints will limit this market’s 
growth in the short- to medium-term: 1) underfund-
ing; 2) capacity; and 3) volatility.
Underfunding  
If a pension plan is underfunded, the plan sponsor 
has to pay out a much larger cash contribution to do 
the buyout.  Since the recent crisis has sent many 
plans into a severe state of underfunding and plan 
sponsors can ill afford a large one-time charge for a 
buyout at this time, this is a major constraint.  So, 
while plan sponsors may still be interested in doing a 





Source: Punter Southall (2009).members comfort that their benefits are backed 
by the safeguards provided by regulation, while 
providing employers with the certainty that they 
have met their commitments in full.”18 
In addition, one UK official noted during an  •	
interview, “As a society, we’ve moved on from 
defined benefit pensions…albeit recognizing that 
defined contribution pensions are incapable of 
providing similar benefits.  Buyouts are part of 
the process of moving on.”19 
One UK regulator even said during an interview,  •	
“If every scheme that could have done a buy-
out a few years ago did, we’d have less to worry 
about.”20 
In short, buyouts in the United Kingdom are  •	
considered the last (or penultimate) chapter in 
the history of private DB pensions.
In contrast, US policymakers view buyouts not as 
the symptom of an increasingly burdensome institu-
tion but rather as a threat to the DB institution itself.21  
As the U.S. Government Accountability Office re-
cently noted, “Opponents to buyouts contend that…a 
frozen plan that remains within the firm has at least a 
chance of being ‘thawed,’ especially within a collective 
bargaining agreement.”22  Though risky ‘non-insured 
buyouts’ give US policymakers the most pause, buy-
outs in general are not appreciated.  Our discussions 
with three separate individuals in the US government 
about pension buyouts illustrated that they were not 
ready to give up on DB plans: 
“I’m not sure we want to give employers an easy  •	
out.  How does that preserve the DB system?”23 
“Instead of allowing companies to dump their  •	
pension liabilities, we need to start asking ques-
tions about our accounting and regulations 
governing pension plan sponsors.”24 
“…We don’t want to do anything that is going to  •	
make it easier for plan sponsors to dump their 
DB pensions.”25 
In sum, US policymakers are less interested in 
managing the decline of DB plans than they are in 
stopping the decline.26
Conclusion 
In recent years, the UK pension buyout market has 
experienced considerable growth.  While various mar-
ket factors played a role in this growth, the increas-
ingly burdensome nature of DB pension provision 
has been a major one.  Buyouts are no longer reserved 
only for insolvent firms, as they were pre-2004, but 
have instead become a way for solvent sponsors to 
offload a costly and risky obligation.  Though current 
market conditions are not favorable, the long-term 
prospects for the UK buyout market are quite good. 
While US plan sponsors face many of the same 
burdens as their UK counterparts, the development 
of a UK-style insured buyout market in the United 
States is unlikely (at least in the short- to medium-
term).  This assessment is primarily because US poli-
cymakers believe private DB pensions are salvageable.
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Endnotes
1  As Craig (2008) explains, “The term pension 
buyout usually refers to an insured buyout, where a 
trust-based occupational DB pension scheme trans-
fers the responsibility for its pension obligations from 
the trust set up to administer the scheme assets to a 
regulated insurance company, in return for a premi-
um payment. Following this, pensions are paid by the 
insurance company, rather than the trust.”
2  While UK non-insured buyouts attracted consider-
able attention, no new transactions have taken place 
since 2007. As such, this brief focuses on the rise of 
the insured buyout market.  
3  Given that two thirds of all UK DB plans are closed, 
this view seems sensible.
4  This research adopts a multi-method approach 
grounded in qualitative, interview-based techniques 
and case studies.  Specifically, close-dialogue, which 
refers to interviews on a confidential basis with 
no-citation rights directed by a pre-determined set 
of questions, is used to construct a coherent narra-
tive for the market’s development as well as certain 
relevant corporate and transactional case studies.  
The observations that underpin this brief’s analysis 
were collected and cross-checked during interviews 
with 37 individuals across 27 organizations in New 
York, Washington, D.C. and the greater London 
area.  These individuals are buyout providers, indus-
try lobbyists, policymakers, regulators, consultants, 
actuaries, lawyers and pension executives.  For further 
details on the methodology, see Monk (2009). 
5  The UK DB pension system is different from the 
US DB system. For example, the power of the Pen-
sions Regulator, the power of UK trustees and even 
the varying reversion tax rates are all important 
differences.  Moreover, differences between the UK 
insurance industry and the US insurance industry 
are significant, such as the weaker insurance guar-
antees in the United States.  Finally, clear cultural 
differences between the two countries exist, such as 
the rules-driven approach in the United Kingdom 
and the legalistic approach in the United States.  As 
such, drawing implications for the US from the UK 
experience can be difficult.  Nonetheless, as this brief 
explains, certain UK experiences do have relevance in 
the United States. 
6  Author’s personal communication with one of the 
oldest buyout providers in the United Kingdom. 
7  See Pension Protection Fund (2009). 
8  Blake, Cairns, and Dowd (2008).
9  See Munnell and Soto (2007); Monk (2008); and 
Jones, Hunter, and Herbert (2008).
10  In many ways, the buyout decision is very similar 
to an investment decision. It is a decision about how 
best to apply the pension assets to ensure that liabili-
ties are paid (see Arter, 2008).
11  According to a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey, 35 
percent of the closed DB pension plans (which repre-
sents two thirds of all UK DB plans) were considering 
a buyout of some kind in 2007.  See Timmins (2007).
12  While insurers in the United Kingdom are highly 
regulated, capital requirements – based on models 
built by the insurer and approved by the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) – are heterogeneous.  Ac-
cording to a UK government official familiar with 
buy-out models, pricing is “a bit of a black art.”  This 
flexibility allowed for a highly competitive pricing 
environment in 2007 and 2008.
13  Significantly, the introduction of UK government 
longevity bonds could be a way of overcoming the 
insufficient capital in the insurance industry since 
this would allow some of the risk to be passed on to 
capital markets (see Blake et al., 2009).  
14  See Lane Clark & Peacock (2009).
15  Indeed, a recent report by Pension Capital Strate-
gies shows that the first quarter of 2009 was well off 
the 2008 pace, even if £1 billion worth of buyouts 
were still transacted (Pension Capital Strategies, 
2009).   
16  Author’s personal communication.
17  See Stapleton (2009) 
18  Cited in Lane Clark & Peacock (2008). 
19  Author’s personal communication.Center for Retirement Research 6
20  Author’s personal communication.
21  These transactions first attracted attention in the 
United States when financial services firms consid-
ered importing the non-insured variety of buyouts 
that took place in the United Kingdom in 2007. 
However, these controversial transactions have since 
fallen out of favor in the United Kingdom, and an IRS 
Revenue Ruling (2008-45) made them illegal.
22  See U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(2009).
23  Author’s personal communication.
24  Author’s personal communication.
25  Author’s personal communication.
26  See Monk (2009) for more details. Issue in Brief 7
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